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Extinguishing the Firewall:
Addressing the Jurisdictional
Challenges to Bringing Cyber Tort
Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns
The rapid advancement of technology has resulted in new forms
of tortious activity. Increasingly, these cyber torts are perpetrated by
foreign states. Notwithstanding other barriers to collecting damages for
a cyber tort, a plaintiff suing for a foreign-state-perpetrated cyber tort
must prove that the alleged tortious activity satisfies one of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act's exceptions-most likely the noncommercial
tort exception. Recently the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
held that a U.S. court lacked jurisdiction to hear a claim against a
foreign state that hacked a U.S. national's email account. The court
found the noncommercial tort exception inapplicable because the intent
to hack was held by a party abroad, and thus the "entire tort" did not
occur in the United States. This Note argues that the D.C. Circuit
improperly extended the "entire tort" doctrine from traditional physical
torts to cyber torts. Instead, the noncommercial tort exception should
apply to foreign-state-perpetrated cyber torts. This Note further proposes
a modified location test for courts to use in determining whether a cyber
tort satisfies the exception's "occurring in the United States"
requirement.
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INTRODUCTION
We live in an age in which technology is constantly evolving.
From the invention of email in 1978,1 to the launch of the first iPhone
in 2007,2 to the introduction of an autopilot-equipped Tesla automobile
in 2015,3 technology is undoubtedly advancing at a rapid rate. It is no
surprise that these and other advances in technology have coincided
with novel forms of unlawful activity. In the past five years, cyber
torts-tortious activity primarily conducted through cyberspace-have
occurred with alarming frequency against a wide variety of victims,
1. Doug Aamoth, The Man Who Invented Email, TIME (Nov. 15, 2011),
http://techland.time.com/2011/11/15/the-man-who-invented-email/ [https://perma.cc/4MJF-48JS].
2. Juli Clover, 10 Years Ago Today, the Original iPhone Officially Launched, MACRUMORS
(July 29, 2017, 7:05 AM), https://www.macrumors.com/2017/06/29/iphone-10-years/
[https://perma.cc/HU4E-RZ52].
3. Your Autopilot Has Arrived, TESLA (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.tesla.com/bloglyour-
autopilot-has-arrived [https://perma.cc/ZU26-XHC6].
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including Equifax,4 the U.S. Securities. and Exchange Commission,5
and, perhaps most infamously, the 2016 U.S. presidential election.6
Indeed, the Democratic National Committee ("DNC") recently filed suit
against the Russian Federation for its role in hacking the DNC's servers
during the 2016 presidential election.'
Although high-profile cyber torts garner the most media
attention, smaller, targeted hacks also have the potential to inflict
significant damage. In June 2017, a single entity hacked DLA Pipers
Merck, and Heritage Valley Health Systems, among others. 9 Critically,
the hack of Heritage Valley Health Systems impaired the functioning
of some hospital equipment. 10 Thankfully, the system impairment at
Heritage Valley did not result in the loss of life; however, such grievous
consequences are not outside the realm of possibility, especially given
health care's increasing reliance on technology."
4. Jamie McGee, Nearly Half of Tennessee Residents Affected by Equifax Breach, AG Says,
TENNESSEAN (Sept. 19, 2017, 4:43 PM), http://www.tennessean.com/story/money/2017/0 9 /1 9 /
equifax-breach-tennessee-slatery-letter-security/68 2 7 9 4 0 0 1/ [https://perma.ccL99B-9H4H].
5. Sarah N. Lynch & Dustin Volz, Hack of Wall St Regulator Rattles Investors, Lawmakers,
REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2017, 11:07 AM), https://www.reuters.comlarticle/legal-sec-cyber/hack-of-wall-
st-regulator-rattles-investors-lawmakers-idUSKCN1BW2AY [https://perma.cclW2HQ-LZQV].
6. Russian Hacking and Influence in the U.S. Election, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/russian-election-hacking (last visited Dec. 13, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/7UVF-9CCD] [hereinafter Russian Hacking Coverage].
7. Complaint, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Russian Federation, -No. 1:18-cy.03501-JGK
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2018), 2018 WL 1885868; see also Jury Demand & Amended Complaint,
Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Russian Federation, No. 1:18-cv-03501-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2018).
8. Debra Cassens Weiss, DLA Piper Hit by 'Major Cyber Attack' amid Larger Hack
Spreading to US, A.B.A. J. (June 27, 2017, 12:27 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
dla piperis-hit-by-majorcyberattackamid_1argerhack-spreading-tous [https://perma.cc/
7EA4-QQH7].
9. Chris Mondics, Merck Hack Part of a Massive Global Attack, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 27,
2017, 11:32 AM), http://www.philly.com/phillyfbusiness/merck-is-the-target-of-a-massive-hack-
20170627.html [https://perma.cc/25KT-K8WQ]; Chelsea Simeon, Heritage Valley Health System
Hit by 'Widespread' Cyber Attack, WKBN FIRST NEWS 27 (June 27, 2017, 2:54 PM),
https://www.wkbn.com/local-news/heritage-valley-health-system-hit-by-widespread-cyber-
attack/1067722397 [https://perma.cc/DU3Y-H7W8].
10. Simeon, supra note 9; see also Heritage Valley Health, Drugmaker Merck Hit by Global
Ransomware Cyberattack, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (June 27, 2017, 11:30 AM),
http://www.post-gazette.com/business/tech-news/2017/06/27/Heritage-Valley-Health-Merck-
targets-cyberattack-pennsylvania-ransomware/stories/ 2 01706270148 [https://perma.cc/DP23-
974G] (discussing the operational slowdowns resulting from the hack, which necessitated the
rescheduling of surgical procedures).
11. See David Goldman, A Hacker Can Give You a Fatal Overdose, CNN (June 10, 2015, 11:31
AM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/06/10/technology/drug-pump-hacklindex.html [https://perma.cc/
2YCQ-9TNX] (noting story of Billy Rios, an independent security researcher, who "discovered the
potentially much more dangerous vulnerability: A hacker could purposefully give a patient a fatal
overdose"); see also Heritage Valley Health "Working to Determine" Whether Patient Information
Stolen in Cyber Attack, PITTSBURGH'S ACTION NEWS 4, https://www.wtae.com/article/
cybersecurity-incident-heritage-valley-health-system/10 2 2 8015 (last updated June 28, 2017, 6:00
PM) [https://perma.cc/3L2P-7LH9] (discussing how the hospital continued with some surgeries,
though others were postponed); Updates on the Cyber Security Incident at Heritage Valley Health
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More commonly, hacks cause severe economic damage. The
insurance market Lloyd's of London estimates that economic damage
from a single "serious cyber-attack" could total more than $120 billion. 12
Moreover, in 2016 alone, "cybercrime cost the global economy over $450
billion, over 2 billion personal records were stolen and in the U.S. alone
over 100 million Americans had their medical records stolen." 13 As these
examples show, damaging and unlawful cyberactivity is becoming
increasingly commonplace-already affecting billions of victims. 1 4
Given the increased use of cyberspace to commit unlawful
activity, it comes as no surprise that foreign states are also using
cyberspace to conduct illicit activities. Numerous countries have
recently been connected to high-profile cyber torts, including the United
States' monitoring of communications from high-level foreign officials
such as German chancellor Angela Merkel; 15 the North Korean hack of
Sony Pictures; 16 and Russian interference with the 2016 U.S.
presidential election,17 the 2017 French election,18 and the 2018 Winter
Olympics.1 9 These incidents raise two important questions: What legal
framework applies to cyber torts, and how can victims seek redress for
cyber torts perpetrated by foreign states?
System, HERITAGE VALLEY HEALTH SYs., http://www.heritagevalley.org/news-posts/updates-on-
the-cyber-security-incident-at-heritage-valley-health-system (last updated July 3, 2017, 7:25 PM)
[https://perma.cc/G72A-DR9K] (mentioning the challenge in providing care without access to
computers).
12. Julia Kollewe, Lloyd's Says Cyber-attack Could Cost $120b, Same as Hurricane Katrina,
GUARDIAN (July 17, 2017, 2:03 AM), https://www.theguardian.comlbusiness/2017/jul/17/lloyds-
says-cyber-attack-could-cost- 120bn-same-as-hurricane-katrina [https://perma.cc/S4MY-7LUQ].
13. Luke Graham, Cybercrime Costs the Global Economy $450 Billion: CEO, CNBC (Feb. 7,
2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/07/cybercrime-costs-the-global-economy-450-
billion-ceo.html [https://perma.cclK8VX-Q2HC] (quoting Steve Langan, chief executive at Hiscox
Insurance).
14. See id. (noting that amid an "'epidemic of cybercrime'. . . [c]ompanies are increasingly
factoring cyber-attacks into their business").
15. James Ball, NSA Monitored Calls of 35 World Leaders After US Official Handed over
Contacts, GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2013, 2:50 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/
nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls [https://perma.cc/9JPB-UYQU].
16. David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered Cyberattack
on Sony, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/asialus-links-
north-korea-to-sony-hacking.html [https://perma.cc/FK7J-CG8Y].
17. Russian Hacking Coverage, supra note 6.
18. Andy Greenberg, The NSA Confirms It: Russia Hacked French Election 'Infrastructure,'
WIRED (May 9, 2017, 12:36 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/nsa-director-confirms-russia-
hacked-french-election-infrastructure/ [https://perma.cc/38VT-HWHZ].
19. Ellen Nakashima, Russian Spies Hacked the Olympics and Tried to Make It Look Like
North Korea Did It, U.S. Officials Say, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-spies-hacked-the-olympics-and-
tried-to-make-it-look-like-north-korea-did-it-us-officials-say/2018/02/24/44b5468e 
-18f2-1 le8-
92c9-376b4fe57ff7_story.html [https://perma.ccl9KSC-VRMC].
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Because cyber torts do not perfectly conform to traditional legal
parameters, courts have had to adapt and reinterpret current laws in
order to provide victims with a judicial avenue through which they can
hold perpetrators of cyber torts accountable. 20 In their empirical study
of cyber tort litigation, Professors Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig
identified "traditional causes of action modified or reshaped
significantly by the Internet" as one of many phenomena brought on by
cyber torts.21 This Note focuses on those, answering whether cyber tort
victims can seek legal redress for foreign-state-perpetrated cyber torts
and, if so, how.
Central to this inquiry is determining whether foreign states are
entitled to sovereign immunity for cyber torts. Foreign sovereign
immunity precludes individuals from bringing civil suits against
foreign states absent particular allowances. 22 In the United States,
victims may seek civil redress from a foreign state only if the state's
activity falls within one of the general exceptions to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA") 2 3 or a targeted exception to
the FSIA, such as the recently passed Justice Against Sponsors of
Terrorism Act ("JASTA").24 If a foreign state's action falls under an
exception to the FSIA, immunity does not apply, and the FSIA confers
jurisdiction over the action to U.S. courts.25 Most state-perpetrated
cyber torts appear to fall most naturally under the noncommercial tort
20. See generally Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An
Empirical Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77, 77 (2003) ("[T]he rise of a new technology
requires courts to stretch traditional tort doctrines as well as to create updated torts to keep pace
with new civil wrongs."); Paul Rosenzweig, When Companies Are Hacked, Customers Bear the
Brunt. But Not for Long., NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 15, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/115187/
cybersecurity-liability-court-cases-are-changing-blame-game [https://perma.cc/DC2N-MCEH]:
Legal developments in [the cyber tort] area are hesitant and incomplete, but two recent
decisions from the federal courts of appeals point the way toward the development of
this doctrine. The cases both involve third party liability .. . and are a step short of the
product liability doctrines that would be inherent in software design claims.
21. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 20, at 116. The other subsets of cyber tort litigation
identified by Professors Rustad and Koenig are "intentional torts, where the Internet is merely an
instrumentality for civil wrongs, . . . and ... the missing category of new cybertort duties and
causes of action." Id. at 115-16.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012).
23. Id. §§ 1605(a)-(b). General exceptions to foreign-state immunity arise in cases of explicit
or implicit waiver; commercial activity in or directly affecting the United States; property taken
in violation of international law; rights to property acquired by succession or gift or rights to
property located in the United States; personal injury, death, or damage or loss of property caused
by a tortious act or omission that occurred in the United States; enforcement of an arbitration
agreement made between a foreign state and a private party; and admiralty lawsuits to enforce a
maritime lien based on commercial activity. See id.
24. Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605B).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a).
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exception. 26 However, in a recent decision addressing a cyber tort
allegedly perpetrated by the Ethiopian government, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit introduced another hurdle to cyber tort
victims, holding that the noncommercial tort exception does not apply
when the intent to commit the tort is held by a party located outside of
the United States. 27 Under this strict interpretation of the
noncommercial tort exception, redress for victims of foreign-state-
perpetrated cyber torts would be almost entirely foreclosed.2 8
This Note argues that the D.C. Circuit's extension of the "entire
tort" doctrine to preclude jurisdiction over foreign states where the
person holding the intent to commit the tort was abroad was misplaced.
Instead, this Note proposes a test for courts to determine whether a
cyber tort "occurred in the United States" modeled after current
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. The proposed test focuses on where
the harm occurred rather than where the party harboring intent is
located and is consistent with the original interpretation of the "entire
tort" doctrine. In doing so, this Note resolves concerns posed by some
scholars that the noncommercial tort exception is inapplicable to most
cyber torts.29 Part I discusses the history of foreign sovereign immunity
and the current legal scheme in the United States. Part II introduces
the current proposals for holding foreign states accountable for cyber
torts, then examines the D.C. Circuit's holding in Doe v. Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in more detail. Part III argues against
the "entire tort" doctrine's application to determine the situS 3 0 of cyber
torts and instead provides a modified jurisdictional test to determine
whether a cyber tort occurred in the United States. This Note concludes
by discussing why the proposed jurisdictional test is a better solution
than the Doe court's approach.
26. Id. § 1605(a)(5).
27. 851 F.3d 7, 11-12 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see also 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 159
(2017) (summarizing Doe v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and other cases applying the
"entire tort" doctrine).
28. This Note focuses on why the noncommercial tort exception includes intentional cyber
torts committed by foreign sovereigns. Whether the proposed location test applies to negligence
claims is beyond the scope of this Note.
29. See infra Part II.
30. "The location or position (of something) for legal purposes, as in lex situs, the law of the
place where the thing in issue is situated." Situs, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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I. THE U.S. APPROACH TO FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. A Brief History of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
The concept of foreign sovereign immunity evolved from the
prevailing view during the Middle Ages that all kings were of equal
standing, and thus "one sovereign monarch could not be subject to the
jurisdiction of another sovereign monarch." 31 The incorporation of this
principle into U.S. law can be traced to Chief Justice John Marshall's
opinion in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.32 In concluding that
foreign war ships were entitled to sovereign immunity, Chief Justice
Marshall reasoned that the "perfect equality and absolute
independence of sovereigns . .. have given rise to a class of cases in
which every sovereign is understood to wave [sic] the exercise of a part
of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated
to be the attribute of every nation." 33 Subsequent cases extended the
Schooner holding to other types of property, 34 cementing the absolute
theory of sovereign immunity as the guiding principle in the United
States. 35 The absolute theory of sovereign immunity held that "a
sovereign cannot, without . .. consent, be made a respondent in the
courts of another sovereign." 36 Under this theory of sovereign
immunity, foreign states "enjoyed a high level of immunity and
exceptions, if any, were not widely recognized." 37
During the early-to-mid-twentieth century, countries began to
move away from the absolute theory of foreign sovereign immunity and
31. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-
ORIENTED APPROACH 314-15 (4th ed. 2015).
32. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137, 145-46 (1812) (holding that it was "a principle of public law,
that national ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to be
considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction").
33. Id. at 137. This reasoning was based on the notions of international comity, in that
[o]ne sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations
of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or
its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign
territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities
belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are
reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.
Id.
34. See, e.g., Exparte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (involving a claim brought against
a foreign vessel for commercial activity); Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (involving
a merchant vessel delivering damaged cargo).
35. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to Philip B. Perlman,
Acting Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984, 984 (1952)
[hereinafter Tato Letter].
36. Id.
37. Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case
Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 915, 925 (2011).
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toward a more restrictive interpretation. 3 8 The restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity recognizes "the immunity of the sovereign ... with
regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with
respect to private acts (jure gestionis)."39 Although U.S. courts in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries deferred to the executive on some
immunity questions,40 they did not begin to more robustly defer
immunity determinations to the executive until the mid-twentieth
century.41 In 1952, State Department acting legal adviser Jack Tate
wrote a letter to the Attorney General ("Tate Letter"), stating that
absolute immunity was no longer appropriate and that the State
Department would follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
going forward.42 Arguing that the restrictive theory would align the
United States with the majority of other countries, Tate concluded that
"the widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of
engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which
will enable persons doing business with them to have their rights
determined in the courts." 43 Though this transition began shortly after
the Tate Letter, the restrictive theory was not officially adopted until
Congress codified it in 1976.4
B. Codifying the Restrictive View: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976
In 1976, the United States codified the restrictive approach to
foreign sovereign immunity through the enactment of the FSIA. 4 5 In
addition to providing statutory guidelines for determining foreign
38. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 31, at 319 ("During the 1940s and 1950s, state practice moved
away from the absolute theory. During this period, the State Department conducted a study of the
relevant practices of other states and eventually reached the conclusion that immunity should not
be granted in cases involving private, as contrasted with sovereign, acts.").
39. Tate Letter, supra note 35, at 984.
40. See Wuerth, supra note 37, at 924-25 ("Courts deferred to the executive on some
questions, such as the existence of the government in question, but did not view themselves as
bound by the executive's suggestion of immunity.").
41. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943) (holding that the State
Department's recognition of Peru's claim of immunity "must be accepted by the courts as a
conclusive determination by the political arm of the Government that the continued retention of
the vessel interferes with the proper conduct of our foreign relations"); see also Republic of Mexico
v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (holding it was not for the judiciary to "deny an immunity which
our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the
government has not seen fit to recognize").
42. See Tate Letter, supra note 35.
43. Id. at 985.
44. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) ("On occasion,
political considerations led to suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity would not have
been available under the restrictive theory.").
45. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2012).
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immunity, the FSIA shifted the authority of determining whether a
foreign state was immune from the executive branch to the judiciary. 46
Substantively, the FSIA broadly grants foreign states immunity from
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless a statutory exception applies.47 In
addition to the foreign state itself, the statute extends immunity to "a
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state." 4 8 Although this definition of a foreign state broadens
the reach of the FSIA tremendously, the statute's reach is not
unlimited. The protections provided by the FSIA do not extend to
individual government officials, 49 and it remains unclear whether the
FSIA applies in criminal cases.50
46. Id. § 1602:
The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of
foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests
of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United
States courts. . . . Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by
courts of the United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth
in this chapter.;
see also William F. Webster, Note, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic: Denying
Sovereign Immunity to Violators of International Law, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1109, 1109 (1988)
("Congress intended the Act to transfer from the executive branch to the judicial branch the
decision whether to grant jurisdictional immunity to a sovereign defendant brought before
American courts.").
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 ("Subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States . . . ."); see also Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) ("Under the Act, a foreign state is presumptively immune from
the jurisdiction of United States courts; unless a specified exception applies, a federal court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state.").
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). In turn:
An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means an entity-(1) which is a
separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership
interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is
neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332 (c) and (e) of
this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.
Id. § 1603(b).
49. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 308 (2010) (holding unanimously that the FSIA
does not govern the immunity claims of individual foreign officials).
50. Compare Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 198 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 1999)
(extending jurisdiction under the FSIA in a civil RICO action even though RICO liability requires
existence of indictable acts), and United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997)
("[T]he FSIA addresses neither head-of-state immunity, nor foreign sovereign immunity in the
criminal context. . . ."), with United States v. Hendron, 813 F. Supp. 973, 975 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
("[Tihe Act contains a panoply of provisions that are consistent only with an application to civil
cases and not to criminal proceedings."), and Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 750 F.
Supp. 838, 844 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that neither the FSIA nor § 1330 confers jurisdiction
over foreign states in criminal proceedings). Resolving the FSIA's applicability to criminal cases is
beyond the scope of this Note.
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Before delving into the specifics of the FSIA and whether its
exceptions allow U.S. courts to hear cyber tort claims against foreign
sovereigns, it is important to note that due process rights under the
Fifth Amendment do not appear to extend to foreign sovereigns.51
Though the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue,
the Court has suggested as much. 52 Numerous courts of appeals have
held that foreign states are not "persons" protected by the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, and thus personal jurisdiction
requirements do not apply.53 Although some courts have extended this
line of reasoning to some agencies and instrumentalities of foreign
states, 54 an agency or instrumentality may be entitled to due process
protections if a court determines that the agency or instrumentality has
a different constitutional status than the foreign state that controls it. 5
The determination of whether a foreign state is amenable to suit
in U.S. courts largely hinges on whether cyber torts fall within one of
the FSIA's exceptions-if the actions of the foreign state fall within one
of the exceptions, the FSIA confers both subject matter and personal
51. For further discussion of whether foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities
have due process rights, see Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Nations, Article III, and the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause (Oct. 4, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
52. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992) (suggesting Fifth
Amendment protections do not extend to foreign states); see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 454 cmt. 9 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No.
3, 2017) ("[T]he Supreme Court has not resolved whether foreign states are 'persons' entitled to
due-process protection.').
53. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
("[Regarding statutes,] there is an often-expressed understanding that in common usage, the term
'person' does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed
to exclude it." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 64 (1989))); see also Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582
F.3d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 2009) ("If the States, as sovereigns that are part of the Union, cannot 'avail
themselves of the fundamental safeguards of the Due Process Clause,' we do not see why foreign
states, as sovereigns wholly outside the Union, should be in a more favored position." (citation
omitted) (quoting Price, 294 F.3d at 97)). Contra Wuerth, supra note 51 (arguing that the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause protects foreign states).
54. See, e.g., TMIR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 300-02 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
55. Cf. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S.
611, 623-33 (1983) (establishing a rebuttable presumption that foreign-state-owned agencies carry
a separate juridical status from the foreign government itself), superseded on other grounds by 28
U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1) (2012). Some courts of appeals have extended Bancec's analysis of a foreign-
state-owned agency's juridical status to the question whether a similar agency is entitled to due
process protections. See Corporaci6n Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral v. Pemex-Exloraci6n y
Producci6n, 832 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Although Bancec arose in a different context, it is
'applicable when the question is whether the instrumentality should have due process rights to
which the state is not entitled.'" (quoting Frontera Res. Azer. Corp., 582 F.3d at 400)); TMR
Energy, 411 F.3d at 301 ("We believe the [Bancec] analysis must govern whether the [state-owned
agency] is a 'person' within the meaning of the due process clause . . . .").
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jurisdiction over the foreign state.56 The FSIA contains both general and
specific exceptions to its broad grant of immunity.57 The specific
exceptions narrowly eliminate immunity for acts of terrorism and the
material support thereof.58 General exceptions to the FSIA include (1)
waiver of immunity by the foreign state, (2) noncommercial tortious
activity, (3) commercial activity, and (4) expropriations in violation of
international law.5 9
It is unlikely that a cyber tort committed by a foreign state would
fall under the exception for expropriations of property in violation of
international law, as it is unclear whether electronic property can be
taken.60 Thus, unless a foreign state waives immunity, a cyber tort
claim against a foreign state can only be brought in U.S. courts if either
the commercial activity exception or the noncommercial tort exception
is met. The Supreme Court has defined a foreign state's activity as
commercial in nature only when it is "the type of action[ ] by which a
private party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce.' "61 Because
cyber torts are usually employed to steal information or impair the
functionality of electronic systems, it is unlikely that cyber torts meet
this definition of commercial activity. 62 However, the noncommercial
tort exception is certainly relevant to the adjudication of cyber tort
56. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611; see also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,
488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989) (holding that the FSIA is the "sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a
foreign state"). Once an exception to the FSIA is met, § 1330 provides original jurisdiction to
federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) ("[D]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction ... of
any nonjury civil action against a foreign state . . . [for in personam claims] with respect to which
the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under
any applicable international agreement.").
57. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1605B.
58. Id. § 1605A-1605B.
59. Id. § 1605(a).
60. See Paige C. Anderson, Note, Cyber Attack Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1087, 1090-91 (2017) (acknowledging the lack of jurisprudence and
scholarship on expropriations in the cyber context).
61. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992) (quoting Commercial,
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)). Thus, whether a foreign state's actions are commercial
depends on whether the government is acting as a "regulator of a market" or a "private player
within it." Id.
62. Despite this distinction, the DNC's complaint against Russia appears to rely on both the
noncommercial tort exception and the commercial activity exception. Complaint, supra note 7,
1 29. Some scholars, however, have expressed skepticism that the DNC has a plausible argument
under the commercial activity exception. See Grayson Clary, Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, Where Do Hacking Torts Happen?, LAWFARE (May 1, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://www.1awfareblog.com/under-foreign-sovereign-immunities-act-where-do-hacking-torts-
happen [https://perma.cclZEU5-BZCP] (noting that successfully invoking the commercial activity
exception in the DNC's complaint would "require a difficult spatial analysis"); see also Ingrid
Wuerth, The DNC v. Russia: The Question of Foreign Sovereign Immunity, LAWFARE (Apr. 22,
2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/dnc-v-russia-question-foreign-sovereign-immunity
[https://perma.ce/GDA3-XL46] (discussing the DNC's complaint in detail).
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claims. Specifically, this exception allows claims for monetary damages
against a foreign state (that are not covered by the commercial activity
exception) to be brought in U.S. courts "for personal injury or death, or
damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused
by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or
employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office
or employment." 63 Part II of this Note explores the merits of applying
the noncommercial tort exception to cyber torts and the current
jurisprudence in this area.
II. DECODING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CYBER TORTS AND
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Acknowledging that technological advances have introduced
novel forms of tortious conduct, scholars have proposed a variety of
solutions to the difficulties of bringing cyber tort litigation against
foreign states. The two most prominent suggestions are (1) interpreting
the current noncommercial tort exception to include liability for cyber
tortS6 4 and (2) passing a cyber tort-specific amendment to the FSIA that
is modeled after the terrorism exception. 65 Section II.A explores
whether cyber torts fall under the current language of the
noncommercial tort exception. Section II.B discusses the relative merits
of relying on a cyber tort-specific exception to provide redress to
victims. Section II.C addresses reciprocity arguments against the
inclusion of cyber torts within an exception to the FSIA. Finally, Section
II.D takes an in-depth look at the D.C. Circuit's recent interpretation of
the noncommercial tort exception in Doe v. Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia.
A. Interpreting the Noncommercial Tort Exception to Apply to Cyber
Torts
The noncommercial tort exception to the FSIA66 applies to "(1) a
non-commercial tortious act or omission (2) committed by a state or its
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). Claims based on "the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused," id.
§ 1605(a)(5)(A), and claims "arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights," id. § 1605(a)(5)(B), however, do
not fall under the exception.
64. See Scott A. Gilmore, Suing the Surveillance States: The (Cyber) Tort Exception to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV., Spring 2015, at 227.
65. See Anderson, supra note 60.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5):
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agents that (3) causes personal injury or property damage [and] (4)
occur[s] in the United States."67 The first two elements rarely raise
significant legal concerns and therefore do not warrant detailed
analysis in this Note. Satisfying the latter two elements-the conduct
causes "damage to or loss of property" and the conduct occurs in the
United States-is more challenging in the cyber context. 68 This Section
addresses each element in turn.
1. "Personal Injury or Death, or Damage to or Loss of Property"
The noncommercial tort exception's harm element is satisfied
when either of its two prongs-"personal injury or death" or "damage to
or loss of property"-are met. Though, at first glance, cyber torts do not
typically cause "damage to or loss of property" in the traditional sense, 69
some cyber torts could impair system functionality70 or otherwise
damage physical property and thus satisfy this prong.71 In fact, one
such cyber tort was carried out against Iran. In what is largely believed
to be a joint U.S.-Israeli project, Iranian nuclear power plants were
infected with the Stuxnet virus, a malicious computer worm that
"reportedly destroy[ed] roughly a fifth of Iran's nuclear centrifuges by
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States
or of the States in any case . . . not otherwise encompassed in [the commercial activity
exception], in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and
caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee
of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment ....
67. Gilmore, supra note 64, at 252-53 (footnote omitted).
68. Anderson, supra note 60, at 1094.
69. Of course, for a foreign state's conduct to implicate the noncommercial tort exception at
all, the foreign state must violate domestic tort law. Although in many cases this is not an issue,
some courts have held that some common law torts do not extend to the cyber context, even against
domestic actors. See, e.g., Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F.3d 348, 359
(4th Cir. 2006) (discussing the possible nonexistence of a cyber trespass to chattels because the
traditional tort requires physical contact with chattels); Inventory Locator Serv., LLC v. Partsbase,
Inc., No. 02-2695 MAV, 2005 WL 2179185, at *11-12 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 6, 2005) (dismissing a
trespass to chattels counterclaim because the electronic database that the plaintiff hacked was
"not movable personal property"). The extent to which courts do or should recognize cyber torts is
a topic beyond the scope of this Note.
70. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 306 (Cal. 2003) (suggesting that limiting a server's
functionality would qualify as damage to property). Additionally, software (the programming
component of electronic devices) and hardware (the physical components) have a symbiotic
relationship. Thus, even though cyber torts typically target software, the physical components of
the machine can also suffer functional limitations or physical damage.
71. See Gilmore, supra note 64, at 265 ("[A]t common law, a violation of privacy is an injury
to the psyche. And nothing in the FSIA contradicts that traditional understanding. Courts
construing the FSIA should therefore follow the common law and treat electronic privacy violations
as personal injuries.").
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causing them to spin out of control." 72 It remains debatable whether
cyber torts resulting in nontraditional harms-such as theft of bank
details or other sensitive information-satisfy the "damage to or loss of
property" requirement. Courts have employed various approaches to
decide whether these types of injuries qualify as damage to or loss of
property; they range from stringently requiring that a cyber tort limit
the server's functioning73 to more relaxed standards that demand only
a showing of unauthorized use.7 4
Cyber torts are more likely to satisfy the harm element under its
other prong: when a foreign state causes "personal injury." The FSIA
does not define "personal injury," but Black's Law Dictionary defines
"personal injury" as including "[a]ny invasion of a personal right,
including mental suffering and false imprisonment."75 Thus, cyber torts
resulting in stolen bank information or confidential, proprietary
technology would constitute an invasion of a personal right-the right
to privacy-and satisfy the "personal injury" requirement. The Ninth
Circuit applied this interpretation when it held that jurisdiction was
proper over the plaintiffs privacy claim in Alpha Therapeutic Corp. v.
Nippon Hoso Kyokai.76 The claim alleged that a foreign-state-employed
reporter secretly recorded an interview conducted at the plaintiffs
home.77 Similar to the injuries inflicted by most cyber torts, this secret
interview recording would be unlikely to cause damage to or loss of
property but nevertheless creates a personal injury.
2. "Occurring in the United States"
A more difficult hurdle for including cyber torts within the
noncommercial tort exception is the "occurring in the United States"
requirement.78 This requirement hinges on what is considered to be the
72. Michael B. Kelly, The Stuxnet Attack on Iran's Nuclear Plant Was 'Far More Dangerous'
than Previously Thought, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 20, 2013, 12:58 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/stuxnet-was-far-more-dangerous-than-previous-thought-2013-11
[https://perma.cc/3VLX-3FYBI.
73. See Intel Corp., 71 P.3d at 306.
74. See Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2226-32 (2004)
(reviewing cases where courts allowed system owners to exclude unwanted uses if system owners
provided strong signals that the uses were unwanted).
75. Personal Injury, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). For further
discussion of the merits of interpreting the personal injury or property damage requirement to
include injuries caused by cyber torts, see Gilmore, supra note 64, at 262-65.
76. 199 F.3d 1078, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The district court determined that NHK
implicitly conceded that Dr. McAuley's invasion of privacy claim fell within the tortious activity
exception to the FSIA."), order withdrawn on other grounds, 237 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001).
77. Id. at 1083.
78. The Supreme Court appears to use the statutory language "occurring in the United
States" and the language "committed in" interchangeably with regard to the noncommercial tort
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situs of a cyber tort. Before the rapid advancement of technology and,
with it, the proliferation of cyber torts, some courts viewed the
requirement of "occurring in the United States" through the lens of the
"entire tort" doctrine. This Section first traces the history and
application of the doctrine and then argues against its application to
cyber torts.
a. Determining the Situs of Traditional Torts Using the "Entire Tort"
Doctrine
The "entire tort" doctrine can be traced to the D.C. Circuit's
opinion in Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States.79 In
Asociacion de Reclamantes, the plaintiffs represented the successors in
interest of land grants from the King of Spain or Republic of Mexico
that covered twelve million acres in modern-day Texas.80 Though
ownership of the land had been disputed since the Mexican-American
War, a 1941 treaty released the United States from liability on any
Mexican claim to the land grants at issue, with each country agreeing
to satisfy the claims of its own nationals.81 Over forty years later, the
Mexican government had not paid a single claim to the successors in
interest. 82 These successors then brought suit against the Mexican
government in the United States and claimed that the U.S. courts had
jurisdiction under the noncommercial tort exception to the FSIA.83
Although the initial tortious activity may have occurred on U.S.
soil,84 the crux of the plaintiffs' claims was Mexico's failure to provide
compensation for the land grants.85 As such, the court reasoned, "it
[was] clear that the conduct complained of lack[ed] the required nexus
with the United States."8 6 Although the prior tortious activity was
relevant to the plaintiffs' claim, the court concluded that it was
exception. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439-41 (1989)
(holding that damage to a ship located five thousand miles off the nearest U.S. coastline did not
satisfy the "occurring in the United States" requirement of the noncommercial tort exception
because the tort was not committed in U.S. "territory and waters, continental and insular," as
defined by the FSIA).
79. 735 F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
80. Id. at 1519.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1524.
84. Id. ("It is not contended in the present case that any of Mexico's acts that could
conceivably be regarded as having been committed on United States soil-the espousal,
presentation and settlement of the claims-was in and of itself tortious.").
85. Id. at 1524-25.
86. Id. at 1524. The court further opined that "[a]lthough the statutory provision is
susceptible of the interpretation that only the effect of the tortious action need occur here, where
Congress intended such a result elsewhere in the FSIA it said so more explicitly." Id.
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insufficient that only some acts causing the injury occurred on U.S. soil;
instead, in order for the noncommercial tort exception to apply, all acts
needed to occur in the United States. 87 The court concluded that it was
"[declining] to convert [the noncommercial tort exception] into a broad
exception for all alleged torts that bear some relationship to the United
States."88
In Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, the D.C. Circuit expanded on this
principle by holding that the "entire tort" doctrine is not satisfied when
tortious conduct occurs abroad, even if the injury is experienced in the
United States. 89 In this case, Jerez brought a tort claim against Cuba
for the injuries he suffered while incarcerated in Cuba;90 specifically, he
experienced ongoing cirrhosis of his liver after Cuban officials allegedly
injected him with Hepatitis C. 91 Although the injection of the virus
occurred in Cuba,92 Jerez claimed that the continued harms he
experienced in the U.S. satisfied the "occurring in the United States"
requirement.93 The court rejected this argument, holding that the
"entire tort" did not occur in the United States because the infliction of
the injury occurred in Cuba, and consequently the action did not fall
under the noncommercial tort exception to the FSIA.94 However, the
court left open the possibility that when a sovereign that intends to
cause harm is located abroad but the injury occurs in the United States,
a tort might satisfy the "occurring in the United States" requirement. 95
87. Id. at 1525.
88. Id.
89. 775 F.3d 419, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ('The law is clear that 'the entire tort'-including not
only the injury but also the act precipitating that injury-must occur in the United States."
(quoting Asociacion de Reclamantes, 735 F.2d at 1525)).
90. Id. at 421. Jerez was allegedly electrocuted, forced to live in inhospitable conditions, and
purposefully injected with the Hepatitis C virus. See id. ("Readers familiar with Against All Hope,
Armando Valladares's account of his incarceration by the same parties, will find much of Jerez's
treatment similar to that inflicted on Valladares and depicted by him as having been extended to
many of his fellow prisoners.").
91. Id. at 424.
92. Id. ("The problem for Jerez is that the defendants' alleged tort-purposefully injecting
him with hepatitis C, otherwise subjecting him to conditions that caused hepatitis C, and failing
to warn him of the virus-occurred in Cuba.").
93. Id.
94. Id. at 424-25. Jerez also argued that each replication of the Hepatitis C virus constituted
a separate tort, and thus both the action and the injury occurred in the United States. The court
similarly found this line of reasoning to be unpersuasive. Id. at 424.
95. Id. at 424. Jerez attempted to analogize his injury to the hypothetical situation of a
foreign agent delivering an anthrax package or bomb to a recipient in the United States. The court
distinguished Jerez's suit: "But here the defendants' infliction of injury on Jerez occurred entirely
in Cuba, whereas the infliction of injury by the hypothetical anthrax package or bomb would occur
entirely in the United States." Id. (emphasis added).
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b. The Challenges of Determining the Situs of Cyber Torts
Applying the "entire tort" doctrine to determine where cyber
torts occur is not as straightforward as with traditional tortious activity
like that at issue in Jerez and Asociacion de Reclamantes.96 In each case,
it was easy to identify the physical locations where both the tortious
action and injury took place. Cyber torts, however, are perpetrated
through the use of cyberspace, the nature of which immediately
complicates this analysis. In cyberspace, multiple people in different
locations are able to concurrently access the same information.
Similarly, dispersed data servers create the opportunity for a single
action to impact numerous locations simultaneously. For example, a
person located in Russia could hack a U.S. citizen's data, which is stored
on a server in Canada. In this case, all three jurisdictions-Russia, the
United States, and Canada-would be impacted at the same time by
the same action. Conversely, a physical tort can only impact multiple
locations in a sequential order.97 The following example further
illustrates the difficulties of determining where a cyber tort occurred.
Person D, a U.S. citizen, is targeted by the foreign government
of Country E in response to Person D remotely assisting a human rights
movement in Country E. Country E emails a software virus to Person
D, whose computer is infected with the virus when he opens the email
attachment. The software virus records all activity on the infected
computer and sends the information to a server located in Country E.
Person D, upon discovering the malicious software, intends to file suit
against Country E for invasion of privacy in U.S. court.98 However, in
order to bring a proper suit against Country E, Person D must establish
that U.S. courts have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over
Country E under the FSIA. To do so, Person D must show that the
action occurred in the United States.
Given that data in cyberspace exists in multiple locations at the
same-time, how can a court reasonably determine the physical location
of a cyber tort? The "entire tort" doctrine is ill suited to determine where
a cyber tort occurred because the sovereign-tortfeasor most likely acted
outside the United States and through an environment that does not
have a single, discrete location. If all courts employed the "entire tort"
doctrine to determine where a cyber tort occurs, a court would have
96. Id.; Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
97. See, e.g., Jerez, 775 F.3d 419 (declining applicability of noncommercial tort exception
where the injury was first inflicted in Cuba and, after the victim travelled, its effects were later
felt in the United States).
98. This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Doe v. Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia, 851 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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jurisdiction to adjudicate a cyber tort only if the sovereign's agent is
sitting in the United States when he inflicts harm, which is almost
never the case. The D.C. Circuit's analysis of the fact pattern above,
which this Note argues is erroneous, is examined infra Section II.D.
B. A Cyber Tort-Specific Exception to the FSIA Is Unnecessary
Some scholars have advocated for the passage of a cyber tort-
specific exception modeled after the recently passed terrorism
exception.9 9 In her note, Paige Anderson argues that passage of such an
amendment would "prevent[] claimants from having to rely on
common-law precedent or ill-fitting statutes to assert their right to a
remedy."100 Although a newly passed exception would provide claimants
with a private right of action that does not rely on the current
exceptions to the FSIA, such an exception is not necessary to provide an
avenue for relief and would significantly delay redress for victims.101
A cyber tort-specific amendment is unlikely to receive the same
political support that was necessary to enact the FSIA's existing specific
amendments. Nearly three thousand people perished in the September
11 attacks, which are widely accepted as the "worst and most audacious
terror attack in American history."102 In the aftermath of the attacks,
Congress enacted a number of significant pieces of legislation, most of
which garnered bipartisan support. 103 Although the effects of a cyber
tort are devastating in their own right, it is simply hard to imagine that
a cyber tort-even one affecting billions of users' data-could create
99. See Anderson, supra note 60. The terrorism exception is a specific exception to the FSIA
that rescinds immunity from foreign states for "act[s] of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources" provided that the
foreign state "was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the act ... occurred, or
was so designated as a result of such act." 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012).
100. Anderson, supra note 60, at 1103.
101. See supra Section II.A (discussing the application of the noncommercial tort exception to
cyber torts); see also Gilmore, supra note 64 (discussing the reasons the noncommercial tort
exception applies to cyber torts).
102. Serge Schmemann, U.S. ATTACKED; President Vows to Exact Punishment for 'Evil,'N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/us-attacked-president-vows-to-
exact-punishment-for-evil.html [https://perma.cc/HN5M-L6WL].
103. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (creating the National Security Division within the Department of
Justice); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (creating the
Department of Homeland Security); Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (authorizing the creation of the Transportation Security Administration
to replace the use of private security guards); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (amending various existing laws to expand the detection,
prevention, and punishment of terrorism).
408 [Vol. 72:1:391
EXTINGUISHING THE FIREWALL
enough bipartisan political momentum and public support as those
generated in response to the September 11 attacks.
Additionally, new FSIA exceptions must work their way through
the slow legislative process, which would substantially delay a victim's
ability to seek redress. The recently passed domestic-terrorism
exception104 to the FSIA is a perfect example of this; despite the bill's
introduction in December 2009,105 the bill was not passed until
September 28, 2016.106 Of course, the driving force behind the domestic-
terrorism exception was to provide redress to victims of the September
11 attacks, which occurred fifteen years prior to the passage of the
bill.107 Although this time lapse is not necessarily dispositive of how
other FSIA amendments would fare in Congress, the legislative process
is often lengthy, and the sheer volume of bills proposed in Congress
relative to those enacted is staggering, which gives plenty of reason to
believe that an amendment is unlikely to provide immediate relief to
victims.108
Thus, although a cyber tort-specific exception would address the
jurisdictional questions discussed above, the uncertainty inherent in
the legislative process and the likely lack of political motivation
surrounding it renders this a less attractive option. Moreover, a more
practical interpretation of the noncommercial tort exception renders
any amendment unnecessary. And instead of waiting on the lengthy
legislative process, victims would be able to rely on the current legal
scheme to seek justice and recompense immediately. Additionally,
using the current noncommercial tort exception to resolve cyber tort
cases would allow courts to interpret various cyber tort cases and fact
patterns under the noncommercial tort exception-thus enabling a
future legislature to better craft a cyber tort-specific amendment that
is appropriately tailored.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1605B. In her note, Anderson proposes a cyber tort-specific amendment based
on the narrower § 1605A terrorism exception, which allows claims to be brought against states
designated as "state sponsor[s] of terrorism." Anderson, supra note 60; see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. In
contrast, the new § 1605B domestic-terrorism exception was enacted in direct response to the
September 11 attacks and extends to states that have not been formally designated as state
sponsors of terrorism. Section 1605B-the direct response to the September 11 attacks-was
enacted more than fourteen years after the attacks.
105. Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 2930, 111th Cong. (2009) (initial
introduction).
106. Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016).
107. See Patricia Zengerle, Senate Passes Bill Allowing 9/11 Victims to Sue Saudi Arabia,
REUTERS (May 17, 2016, 11:38 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-usa-congress/
senate-passes-bill-allowing-9-11 -victims-to-sue-saudi-arabia-idUSKCNOY8239 [https://perma.cc/
5HVT-EETQ].
108. Statistics and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
statistics (last visited Dec. 17, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7QRQ-3HBQ] (showing the bill-enactment
rate hovering around three percent in recent years).
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C. Addressing Reciprocity Concerns
Any perceived broadening of the exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity raises reciprocity concerns. In vetoing JASTA, President
Obama stressed that "reciprocity plays a substantial role in foreign
relations, and numerous other countries already have laws that allow
for the adjustment of a foreign state's immunities based on the
treatment their governments receive in the courts of the other state." 109
He reasoned that enacting JASTA "could encourage foreign
governments to act reciprocally and allow their domestic courts to
exercise jurisdiction over the United States or U.S. officials .. . for
allegedly causing injuries overseas via U.S. support to third parties."110
Although interpreting the noncommercial tort exception as applying to
cyber torts could similarly encourage reciprocal treatment of the United
States, numerous other countries have already begun examining their
laws to determine how to best address the novel threats posed by the
digital age.11
The global acknowledgment of and fight against cyberthreats
suggest that the United States will soon be accountable for state-
sponsored cyber torts abroad, regardless of whether it similarly adapts
its existing laws. Indeed, the German government suggested that
foreign states would not be immune from suit for cyber torts, when it
launched an investigation to determine whether there was sufficient
evidence to bring suit in German court against the United States for
the alleged hacking of Chancellor Merkel's cellular phone. 112
Interpreting the noncommercial tort exception to include cyber torts
could deter foreign states from engaging in illicit cyberactivity, as the
foreign states would be on notice that they could not use a loophole in
the FSIA to escape liability. This deterrent effect would only strengthen
109. Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Justice Against Sponsors of
Terrorism Act, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 628 (Sept. 23, 2016).
110. Id.
111. See ERIK BRATPBERG & TIM MAURER, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, RUSSIAN
ELECTION INTERFERENCE: EUROPE'S COUNTER TO FAKE NEWS AND CYBER ATTACKS (2018),
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP 333_BrattbergMaurer RussiaElectionsInterferenceFI
NAL.pdf [https://perma.ccl58PV-BQ7B] (discussing various countries' approaches to counter and
address election interference and hacking); see also Kristin Carlberg, Suing a State for Cross-
Border Cyber Torts? Overcoming the Immunity of the Hacking State (Spring 2017) (unpublished
magister thesis, Orebro Universitet), http://www.diva-portal.se/smash/get/diva2:1147530/
FULLTEXT02.pdf [https://perma.cc/256Q-SM3D] (arguing in support of extending tortious-
activity exceptions to certain kinds of cyberthreats).
112. See Snowden NSA- Germany Drops Merkel Phone-Tapping Probe, BBC NEWS (June 12,
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33106044 [https://perma.cc/6WG6-P8BK].
German prosecutors dropped the investigation due to insufficient evidence, not because there were
jurisdictional barriers to redress. See id.
410 [Vol. 72:1:391
EXTINGUISHING THE FIREWALL
if additional countries adopted similar measures to hold foreign states
accountable for cyber torts. Cyberspace provides unprecedented access
to individuals and their personal information and property; given this,
all countries should welcome accountability measures that deter other
foreign states from using cyberspace for nefarious purposes.
D. The Latest Chapter: The D.C. Circuit's Decision in Doe v. Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
In 2017, the D.C. Circuit heard arguments in an appeal brought
by one Kidane for cyber torts allegedly committed by the Ethiopian
government.11 3 Kidane, a former Ethiopian citizen, obtained asylum in
the United States amid political strife in Ethiopia in the early 1990s. 1 14
While residing in the United States, Kidane provided technical and
administrative support to the Ethiopian diaspora, some members of
which participated in protests of political corruption and human-rights
abuses in Ethiopia.115 In late 2012 or early 2013, Kidane opened an
email attachment sent to him by an acquaintance. 116 His computer was
then infected with FinSpy, a remote-monitoring program.117 After the
program was installed, it allegedly recorded "some, if not all, of the
activities undertaken by users of the computer."118 This information
was then communicated to a server located in Ethiopia. 119
Alleging that the Ethiopian government was responsible for the
installation of FinSpy on his computer, Kidane filed suit in U.S. federal
district court, seeking redress under the Wiretap Act and the Maryland
common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion. 120 At issue before the D.C.
Circuit was whether the district court properly dismissed the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction over Ethiopia because the FSIA's
noncommercial tort exception was not satisfied. 12 1 In affirming, the D.C.
Circuit relied on the application of the "entire tort" doctrine discussed
113. Doe v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 851 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Although
the named plaintiff-appellant in the case is John Doe, he is referred to in the proceedings by the
pseudonym "Kidane." Id. at 8.
114. See id. at 8; Motion for Leave to Proceed in Pseudonym at 2, Doe v. Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, 189 F. Supp. 3d 6 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 1:14-cv-00372-RDM).
115. Doe, 851 F.3d at 8; Motion for Leave to Proceed in Pseudonym, supra note 114, at 2.
116. Doe, 851 F.3d at 8.
117. Id. FinSpy is a remote monitoring program sold exclusively to government agencies that
allows them to "monitor[] and gather[] information from electronic devices, including computers
and mobile phones, without the knowledge of the device's user." Id. at 8-9.
118. Id. at 9.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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above. 122 To bolster his jurisdictional argument, Kidane identified
several instances where the noncommercial tort exception permitted
jurisdiction over foreign states even though the intent to commit
tortious activity was held by a party located abroad. 123 Nevertheless,
the D.C. Circuit held that "Ethiopia's digital espionage is of a different
character. Without the software's initial dispatch or an intent to spy-
integral aspects of the final tort which lay solely abroad-Ethiopia
could not have intruded upon Kidane's seclusion under Maryland
law." 12 4
Kidane then turned to the legislative intent of the
noncommercial tort exception, arguing that the lack of limiting
language in the statute suggests that the drafters did not intend to
require that all aspects of the tort occur in the United States. 125
Congress rejected the European Convention on State Immunity's
approach, which requires that tort was committed in the foreign state
and that "the author of the injury or damage was present in that
territory at the time." 126 Kidane additionally pointed to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the "carried on in the United States"
requirement of the commercial activity exception to the FSIA. 127
Rejecting the comparison to the commercial activity exception, the D.C.
Circuit reasoned that, "unlike the commercial activity exception, the
noncommercial-tort exception does not ask where the 'gravamen'
occurred; instead, it asks where the 'entire tort' occurred." 128 Viewing
Ethiopia's alleged involvement as similar to the Cuban government
injecting Jerez with Hepatitis C during his incarceration, the D.C.
Circuit ultimately held that the noncommercial tort exception did not
apply because the "entire tort" did not occur in the United States.129 As
previously discussed, this line of reasoning oversimplifies the locational
status of cyber torts. In doing so, the D.C. Circuit effectively foreclosed
any possibility for victims of cyber torts to hold foreign states
responsible.
122. Id. at 9-10; see supra Section I.A.2.a.
123. This argument and the cases relied on by Kidane are further discussed infra Section III.A.
124. Doe, 851 F.3d at 11.
125. Id.
126. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting European Convention on State Immunity
art. 11, May 16, 1972, E.T.S. No. 74, reprinted in Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against
Foreign States: Hearing on H.R. 11,315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental
Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 39 (1976)).
127. Id.
128. Id. (citation omitted) (first quoting OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390,
396 (2015); then quoting Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517, 1525
(D.C. Cir. 1984)). Of note, this interpretation of the FSIA relies not on the text of the statute but
on the interpretation of the exception in prior cases. See supra Section H.A.2.a.
129. Doe, 851 F.3d at 11-12.
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III. PURSUING JUSTICE: PROVIDING CYBER TORT VICTIMS AN AVENUE
FOR REDRESS
As discussed above, the D.C. Circuit's approach in Doe
effectively gives foreign states carte blanche to perpetrate cyber torts
against individuals and entities in the United States with little fear of
suffering any legal repercussions. Section III.A argues that courts
should not apply the "entire tort" doctrine to cyber torts as the D.C.
Circuit did in Doe. As an alternative to the "entire tort" approach,
Section III.B proposes a location test modeled after the personal
jurisdiction "effects" test established in Calder v. Jones.130 The proposed
test allows courts to distinguish between cyber torts that have a direct
relationship with the United States-based upon the foreign state's
connection to the United States-and those with a more tenuous
relationship based solely upon the victim's relationship to the United
States. Although the jurisdictional test in Calder-and the refined test
later applied in Walden v. Fiorel31-hinged on whether the defendant's
actions or the effects therefrom formed a relationship with a particular
state, 132 this principle can be expanded to whether a defendant's actions
are sufficient to establish a relationship with the United States as a
whole, as is required by the noncommercial tort exception to the FSIA.
A. The D.C. Circuit's Approach Should Be Abandoned
If widely accepted by other circuits, the reasoning employed by
the D.C. Circuit in Doe would make it practically impossible to bring
cyber tort claims against foreign states, regardless of how egregious the
offense. 133 Setting aside the lack of redress, there are a number of
additional reasons why courts should not adopt the Doe court's
interpretation of the "occurring in the United States" requirement. As
a preliminary matter, the "entire tort" language relied on by the Doe
court does not appear in the FSIA.1 34 Rather, the "entire tort" language
comes from lower-court jurisprudence that was popularized following
the D.C. Circuit's decision in Jerez.135 Additionally, the Supreme Court
130. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
131. 571 U.S. 277 (2014).
132. See 465 U.S. at 789.
133. The nature of cyber torts makes it unlikely that the action taken to commit a cyber tort
and the subsequent harm experienced will occur in the same place.
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2012). The "entire tort" interpretation of the "occurring in the
United States" requirement also seems inconsistent with the commercial activity exception to the
FSIA, which contains no comparable restriction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
135. See supra Section I.A.2.a (discussing the history of the "entire tort" doctrine).
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has not adopted the "entire tort" doctrine, 136 and it has not been
universally adopted across circuits with regard to traditional tort
claims. 137
Moreover, interpreting the noncommercial tort exception in this
way is inconsistent with the commercial activity exception, as the
commercial activity exception contains no comparable restriction.
Though some may argue that Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.-
the Supreme Court's landmark case interpreting the commercial
activity exception-should be read to require that all elements of a
plaintiffs claim occur in the United States, this is not what the opinion
actually held. 138 Rather, the Court in Weltover rejected the
requirements of foreseeability and substantiality required by some
states' long-arm statutes 139 and instead focused the inquiry on whether
the effect of the activity itself was direct.140
Such an interpretation also runs counter to the overarching goal
of the noncommercial tort exception.141 The noncommercial tort
exception prevents foreign officials from escaping liability for
noncommercial torts and provides an avenue for recourse to victims. 1 4 2
Though dramatic technological advances have altered the scope and
substance of sovereign relationships since the FSIA's passage in 1976,
136. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992); Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
137. The First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have all adopted or
indicated in dicta that they approve of some iteration of the "entire tort" doctrine. See, e.g., O'Neill
v. Saudi Joint Relief Comm. (In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001), 714 F.3d 109, 115-
16 (2d Cir. 2013); O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 382 (6th Cir. 2009). Courts within the Ninth
and D.C. Circuits, however, have held that the noncommercial tort exception applies to countries
whose liability-inducing actions occurred abroad. See Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1431
(9th Cir. 1989); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980).
138. See 504 U.S. 607.
139. Id. at 618 ("[W]e reject the suggestion that § 1605(a)(2) contains any unexpressed
requirement of 'substantiality' or 'foreseeability.' "); see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 454 cmt. 8 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No.
3, 2017) ("An effect is not direct if it is a remote or attenuated consequence of the act.... Personal
injury sustained in the United States as a result of a foreign sovereign's tortious conduct elsewhere
can constitute a direct effect.").
140. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618 ("[A]n effect is 'direct' if it follows 'as an immediate
consequence of the defendant's . . . activity.'" (omission in original) (quoting Weltover, Inc. v.
Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991))).
141. See S. REP. NO. 94-1310, at 11-12 (1976); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 14 (1976)
(acknowledging "a wide acceptance. . . that the sovereign immunity of foreign states should be
'restricted' to cases involving acts . . . which are sovereign or governmental in nature, as opposed
to acts which are . . . commercial in nature").
142. S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 20-21; H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 14, 20-21; see also Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439-40 (1989) ("Congress' primary
purpose in enacting § 1605(a)(5) was to eliminate a foreign state's immunity for traffic accidents
and other torts committed in the United States, for which liability is imposed under domestic tort
law.").
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the reasoning behind the noncommercial tort exception remains
relevant. In the context of cyber torts, the Doe court's interpretation of
"occurring in the United States" would do precisely what the legislature
sought to prevent-provide foreign states carte blanche to escape
liability for private actions that harm individuals in the United States.
Indeed, holding foreign states accountable for tortious conduct
that did not entirely occur within the United States is not novel. For
example, in Liu v. Republic of China, the Ninth Circuit held that the
noncommercial tort exception applied when two gunmen, acting on the
orders of a Taiwanese admiral, assassinated a man in California, even
though the actions conferring liability on China occurred abroad. 143
Similarly, in Letelier v. Republic of Chile, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled that jurisdiction was proper under the
noncommercial tort exception when Chilean government agents,
operating under Chilean government instructions, constructed,
planted, and detonated a car bomb in Washington, D.C. 144 In Doe, the
court reasoned that these cases were distinguishable from Ethiopia's
conduct because "[b]oth involved actions 'occurring in the United States'
that were-without reference to any action undertaken abroad-
tortious." 1 4 5 However, it was not alleged in Liu or Letelier-nor could it
be-that the actions giving rise to the claims were committed directly
by the foreign states on U.S. soil; rather, in both cases, the individuals
who ultimately carried out the torts were acting under the direction of
officials sitting in the foreign state. 146 Although the tortious activity
alleged in these cases occurred in the United States, the actions for
which the courts held the foreign states liable occurred abroad.147
Finally, the "entire tort" doctrine's focus on territory and
location does not make sense in the context of cyber torts. Cyber torts
target electronically stored data, and although the machines that access
this data are tangible objects, the data itself lacks a physical form. In
Jerez, the court differentiated between the site of the initial injury and
143. 892 F.2d 1419, 1422, 1431 (9th Cir. 1989).
144. 488 F. Supp. 665, 665-66, 673 (D.D.C. 1980).
145. Doe v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 851 F.3d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
146. See Liu, 892 F.2d at 1421 ('Two gunmen acting on orders of Admiral Wong Hsi-ling
(Wong), Director of the Defense Intelligence Bureau (DIB) of the Republic of China (ROC), shot
and killed Henry Liu in Daly City, California."); Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 665-66 ("[The crime was
committed by individuals] acting in concert and purportedly at the direction and with the aid of
defendants Republic of Chile, its intelligence organ the Centro Nacional de Intelligencia (CNI)
(formerly Direccion de Intelligencia Nacional, alk/a DINA), and supposed CNI-DINA agents and
officers. . .. ").
147. See Liu, 892 F.2d at 1422 (describing directions given in China by Admiral Wong Hsi-
ling); Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 665-66 (describing directions and aid provided by government
officials in Chile).
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the continued effects of that injury experienced in the United States.148
The court held that the replication of the Hepatitis C virus in Jerez did
not constitute a separate tort, and Cuba's conduct thus did not meet the
noncommercial tort exception because the original injection of the virus
occurred in Cuba. 149 This is distinguishable from the cyber tort at issue
in Doe because the harmful action in Jerez was inflicted on a tangible
being in a particular location, while the action in Doe was directed at
data that exists in multiple locations simultaneously. The victims for
whom this Note seeks to protect do not travel to the United States after
a tort is committed; rather, the victims are located in the United States
at the time the tort occurs.
B. Relying on Established Jurisprudence to Determine Location
The rejection of the "entire tort" approach employed in Doe
requires an alternative approach to determine where a cyber tort
occurs. Should the location ascribed to a tort focus on where the
precipitating conduct occurred, where it had an effect, or perhaps some
intermediate location along the cyber tort's transmission path (such as
a satellite or server)? This Note proposes an alternative interpretation
of the "occurring in the United States" requirement of the FSIA's
noncommercial tort exception to answer these questions. Specifically,
courts should determine whether the foreign state (1) acted
intentionally, (2) expressly aimed the action at a victim in the United
States, and (3) knew or should have known that the brunt of the injury
would be felt in the United States.150 An objective knowledge standard
for the third prong of this test allows courts to consider the resources
and intelligence uniquely available to foreign states. If the court
determines that the foreign state's express actions satisfy each prong of
the analysis, the cyber tort in question "occurred in the United States"
for the purposes of the FSIA's noncommercial tort exception.
This effects test is similar to the one employed by the Supreme
Court in Calder v. Jones151 and Walden v. Fiore.152 In Calder, Shirley
Jones, an actress who lived and worked in California, brought a libel
148. Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("[T]he continued replication
of hepatitis C and Jerez's cirrhosis of the liver describe an ongoing injury that he suffers in the
United States as a result of the defendants' acts in Cuba." (emphasis added)).
149. See id. ("The law is clear that 'the entire tort'-including not only the injury but also the
act precipitating the injury-must occur in the United States.").
150. Similar to the approach used in Calder v. Jones, the inquiry into whether the brunt of the
injury would be felt in the United States is fact-based and asks whether the ultimate harm was
intended to be felt in the United States. See 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
151. See id.
152. See 571 U.S. 277 (2014).
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suit in California state court over an article published in the National
Enquirer.153 The author and the editor of the article, both of whom
resided in Florida, argued that California state courts lacked personal
jurisdiction over them because neither had physical contacts with
California. 154 Unpersuaded that physical presence in the forum state
was required to confer jurisdiction, the court held that personal
jurisdiction in California was proper over the Florida defendants
because the defendants' actions were (1) intentional, (2) "expressly
aimed" at the forum state, and (3) committed knowing that the "brunt
of that injury would be felt" in the forum state.155
The Court later refined this test in Walden v. Fiore, where it
distinguished between a defendant's mere knowledge that harm would
ultimately be felt in a specific location and a defendant's express aim of
the action at that location. 156 In Walden, a group of drug enforcement
officers seized $97,000 at Atlanta Hartfield-Jackson International
Airport from two passengers travelling from San Juan to Las Vegas.15 7
When one of the agents refused to return the seized money, the
passengers brought suit against him in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nevada.15 8 The Supreme Court held that the district court
lacked personal jurisdiction. 5 9 In doing so, the Court reasoned that
"[flor a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the
defendant's suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection
with the forum State."160 The Court further explained that "however
significant the plaintiffs contacts with the forum may be, those contacts
cannot be 'decisive in determining whether the defendant's due process
rights are violated.' "161 Lower courts have held that this inquiry does
not change when determining whether cyberactivity confers
jurisdiction. 162
153. 465 U.S. at 784-85.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 789-90; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1985)
(holding that personal jurisdiction was proper where the defendant deliberately reached out to a
forum citizen).
156. 571 U.S. at 290.
157. Id. at 279-80.
158. Id. at 281.
159. Id. at 282.
160. Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 285 (quoting Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980)).
162. See Christie v. Nat'1 Inst. for Newman Studies, 258 F. Supp. 3d 494, 500 (D.N.J. 2017)
("[W]hether tortious conduct is committed via the Internet or in more traditional means, does not
change the inquiry of the location where Defendants purposefully aimed their alleged
cyberactivity."); see also Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 473-75 (5th Cir. 2002); ALS Scan, Inc. v.
Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714-15 (4th Cir. 2002); River City Media, LLC v.
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The underlying concern that motivated the Court in Walden-
limiting personal jurisdiction over defendants with too attenuated a
relationship with the forum state163-parallels concerns raised by the
court in Jerez: that the relationship between Cuba's actions and the
United States was insufficient to satisfy the "occurring in the United
States" requirement under the FSIA. 164 Taking these concerns into
account, the location test proposed by this Note requires courts to
determine whether the foreign state's actions satisfy the "occurring in
the United States" requirement based on the express actions of the
foreign state and whether those actions created a substantial
connection with the United States. The express-action requirement
adopts the reasoning of the Walden court and draws a sharp distinction
between the relationship with the United States initiated by the foreign
state and any tangential relationship that results from the victim's ties.
This proposed test not only falls within the parameters of domestic
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence; it also allows courts to adhere to
the legislative reasoning behind the adoption of the noncommercial tort
exception-holding foreign sovereigns liable for torts committed in
violation of U.S. law.165
Although the Supreme Court has implied that due process rights
and their corresponding personal jurisdiction limitations do not apply
to foreign states, 166 the Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
provides an apt framework for a location test under the noncommercial
tort exception. 167 Additionally, some lower courts have recognized that
some agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states are entitled to due
process protections. 168 As a result, these lower courts already engage in
Kromtech All. Corp., No. 2:17-cv-00105-SAB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137938, at *16-17 (E.D.
Wash. 2017); Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 612-17 (E.D. Va. 2002).
163. See supra Section I.B for a discussion of why due process protections likely do not extend
to foreign states or some of their agencies and instrumentalities.
164. See Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ('The problem for Jerez
is that the defendants' alleged tort ... occurred in Cuba.").
165. S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 20-21 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 20-21 (1976).
166. See supra Section I.B.
167. Although the Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is viewed by some scholars as
incoherent, see Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2): A Way to
(Partially) Clean Up the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 413 (2017), the Court's
decision in Walden has been viewed by some as refining the personal jurisdiction test laid out in
Calder, see Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, The Business of Personal
Jurisdiction, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775, 781 (2017). By adopting components of one portion of
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, this Note's solution avoids engaging with the incoherence
expressed by scholars about personal jurisdiction jurisprudence overall. Moreover, the legislative
history of the FSIA seems to suggest that Congress expected personal jurisdiction limitations to
apply in some cases. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
168. See generally Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 623-33 (1983) (establishing a rebuttable presumption
that foreign-state-owned agencies carry a separate juridical status than the foreign government
itself). For a foreign state's agency or instrumentality to be entitled to due process protections, the
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a Bancec constitutional analysis in FSIA cases brought against agencies
and instrumentalities to determine whether due process protections
apply. 169 This Note's proposed location test applies personal jurisdiction
principles-regardless of whether they are constitutionally required-
to all defendants under the FSIA and thus effectively applies due
process limitations on personal jurisdiction to all defendants sued
under the noncommercial tort exception. As a result, courts need not
engage in a separate Bancec constitutional analysis to determine
whether agencies and instrumentalities are entitled to due process
protections; a location test that already incorporates these
constitutional protections renders that determination unnecessary.
The following two hypothetical scenarios illustrate how the
proposed location test would function.
1. An In-Scope Scenario
Country A, incensed over Company B's recent film that made
Country A's leader look foolish, hacks Company B, a U.S. corporation
headquartered in California. The hack deletes key data relating to the
aforementioned film and steals privileged information about Company
B's proprietary technology, staff, and confidential communications. In
hopes of further frustrating Company B's ability to profit from the film,
Country A releases sensitive information about Company B's hiring
practices and salary discrepancies, which was gleaned from the data
stolen during the hack. As a result of Country A's actions, Company B's
revenue severely decreases. 170 Under the approach proposed above, the
"occurring in the United States" requirement would be satisfied because
Country A (1) acted intentionally, (2) expressly aimed its conduct at
Company B, a U.S. corporation, and (3) knew or should have known
that the brunt of the injury-Company B's decreased revenue and the
privacy violations-would be felt by Company B in the United States.
The DNC's complaint against Russia, mentioned earlier, would
similarly satisfy the "occurring in the United States" requirement.171 In
its complaint, the DNC alleged that the Russian government launched
numerous cyberattacks on DNC servers located in Virginia and
agency or instrumentality must have a different constitutional status than the foreign state itself.
See Corporaci6n Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral v. Pemex-Exloraci6n y Producci6n, 832 F.3d
92, 103 (2d Cir. 2016); GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat'l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 814-15 (D.C. Cir. 2012);
TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
169. See TMR Energy, 411 F.3d at 301.
170. This hypothetical is loosely based on the alleged hack perpetrated against Sony by North
Korea. See Sanger & Perlroth, supra note 16.
171. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Washington, D.C., during the 2016 presidential election. 172 The attacks
were purportedly carried out by Russian GRU173 agents acting pursuant
to orders from "high-ranking Russian officials." 174 Assuming these
allegations are true-and despite the assertion from the Russia
government that jurisdiction would "violate international law" 175-the
court would determine that the hack occurred in the United States
because (1) the Russian GRU agents acted intentionally when they (2)
targeted DNC servers located in the United States, and (3) Russia knew
or should have known that the brunt of the injury would be felt in the
United States, as the identified purpose of the hacks was to undermine
Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign.176 Therefore, the proposed
location test would conclude that the alleged hacks occurred in the
United States for purposes of the noncommercial tort exception.
2. An Out-of-Scope Scenario
Person X, a U.S. citizen known for his investigative-journalism
pieces that expose foreign leaders' less-than-savory behavior, is
travelling in Country Y. While in Country Y, Person Xs computer is
purposely infected with malware by Country Ys government. The
malware provides Country Y with access to Person Xs banking
information as well as other sensitive data.177 Country Y uses this
information to blackmail Person X into turning over the information he
had relating to Country Ys government officers. Upon returning to the
United States, Person X files suit in federal district court, claiming
jurisdiction under the noncommercial tort exception to the FSIA for the
172. See Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 66, 77-78, 81; see also Jury Demand & Amended
Complaint, supra note 7, TT 81-84.
173. The GRU is the English equivalent of the Russian acronym FPY and is commonly used
to refer to the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate of the armed forces. See Alex Seitz-Wald,
What Is the GRU? Mueller Indicted the Spy Agency's Operatives, NBC NEWS (July 13, 2018, 2:15
PVI), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/what-gru-mueller-indicted-spy-agency-s-
operatives-n891291 [https://perma.ccl55TE-KA35].
174. See Complaint, supra note 7, ¶ 77; see also Jury Demand & Amended Complaint, supra
note 7, ¶¶ 81-84.
175. Letter from Anatoly I. Antonov, Ambassador of the Russian Fed'n to the U.S., to Hon.
John G. Koeltl, U.S. Dist. Judge, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Russian Federation, No. 1:18-cv-
03501-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2018) ("I have the honor to also inform the Honorable Court that
exercise of jurisdiction over the pending case by U.S. courts with respect to the Russian Federation
is a violation of the international law . . . arising from the principle of the sovereign equality of
states."). For a detailed discussion of the DNC's complaint and the Russian Federation's assertion
of immunity in this case, see Ingrid Wuerth, Russia Asserts Immunity in the DNC Case, LAWFARE
(Nov. 16, 2018, 10:14 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/russia-asserts-immunity-dnc-case
[https://perma.cc/UQ84-3C5Q].
176. See Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 55, 57, 61.
177. This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419,
421 (D.C. Cir. 2014), except it uses a cyber tort instead of the physical harm that Jerez suffered.
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resulting harms he experienced upon returning to the United States.
Under the proposed test, this claim would fail the "occurring in the
United States" requirement. Although the actions of Country Y were
intentional, they do not satisfy the second prong of the test. The only
connections between the United States and the actions of Country Y are
the nationality of Person X and the assumption that Person X would
return to the United States in the future. Thus, the connection between
the United States and the alleged actions of Country Y relies entirely
on Person Xs relationship with the United States. This connection,
similar to that in Walden between the defendants and Nevada, is too
attenuated to confer jurisdiction.17 8
3. Summarizing the Proposed Location Test
As illustrated by these examples, the adoption of the proposed
test would align U.S. courts' treatment of cyber torts perpetrated by
foreign states with the courts' jurisprudence of traditional torts.
Therefore, in instances where a cyber tort was directed at an individual
or corporation in the United States, such as in Doe or Scenario 1, the
FSIA's noncommercial tort exception would apply and thus confer
jurisdiction to U.S. courts. Conversely, if the alleged cyber tort was not
directed at someone in the United States, as discussed in Scenario 2,
the action would not satisfy the proposed location test and would not
fall under the noncommercial tort exception. Interpreting the location
requirement in this way holds foreign states accountable for tortious
actions that occur in the United States, regardless of the medium or
method used to commit the tortious action.
Moreover, the proposed location test does not exceed the current
statutory language; rather, it falls squarely within the plain text of the
rule because it focuses on at least a portion of where the tortious action
occurs and the entirety of where is felt. The incorporation of due process
principles into the FSIA also finds support in the Act's legislative
history. The legislative history shows Congress clearly intended for due
process protections to apply to some agencies and instrumentalities of
foreign states. 179 Although the expressed intent of Congress in favor of
some due process protections does not mean that each FSIA exception
must be extended as far as due process allows, it does suggest that a
178. See supra notes 156-165 and accompanying text (discussing Walden v. Fiore).
179. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 29-30 (1976) ("If U.S. law did not respect the separate
juridical identities of different agencies or instrumentalities, it might encourage foreign
jurisdictions to disregard the juridical divisions between different U.S. corporations . . . ."); see also
Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 626-27 (1983) ("[G]overnment instrumentalities established as juridical
entities distinct and independent from their sovereign should normally be treated as such. We find
support for this conclusion in the legislative history of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.").
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jurisdictional doctrine that fits within due process principles is
consistent with Congress's intent. Additionally, courts have applied or
referred to due process principles to determine whether the statutory
nexus requirements of other FSIA exceptions have been met.1 s0
Determining the situs of cyber torts in the way proposed by this
Note is a straightforward test, the elements of which will be familiar to
courts, who already apply the Calder- Walden framework. Given that
courts are already familiar with the basic elements of the proposed
location test, it will be easier for courts to adopt this approach than to
interpret a new and unfamiliar statute. Finally, the proposed test
ensures that foreign states are held accountable for their tortious
behavior that is directed at the United States and simultaneously
continues to adhere to the U.S. approach to foreign sovereign immunity.
CONCLUSION
The rapid evolution of technology has brought with it
unprecedented advancements in fields such as medicine, renewable
energy, and artificial intelligence, along with the ability for businesses
to operate across the world instantaneously. Unfortunately, the rapidly
changing world of technology has also introduced new ways to violate
legally recognized rights-chief among them the cyber tort. Cyber torts
raise a host of novel legal concerns, which are further complicated when
such tortious activity is committed by a foreign state. Given the
increased prevalence of such torts, including several believed to be
attributable to foreign states, 181 it is imperative that U.S. courts
articulate how such actions will be treated.
The noncommercial tort exception to the FSIA provides an
answer to this conundrum. Through its proposed location test, this Note
argues for an interpretation of this exception that allows victims of
cyber torts to file suit against responsible foreign sovereigns in U.S.
courts. Rather than foreclose the possibility of redress to cyber tort
victims, as the D.C. Circuit effectively did in Doe,182 courts should
instead interpret the "occurring in the United States" requirement to
180. See, e.g., Triple A Int'l, Inc. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, 721 F.3d 415, 418 (6th
Cir. 2013) (Merritt, J., concurring) (relying on the FSIA's legislative history to conclude that the
defendant did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the United States to confer jurisdiction);
Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 1122, 1137 (9th Cir. 2012) (viewing the minimum contacts
analysis as analogous to determining the applicability of the FSIA's commercial activity
exception); BP Chems. Ltd. v. Jiangsu Sopo Corp., 420 F.3d 810, 818 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that
satisfaction of the commercial activity exception disposes of the issue whether the defendant had
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum).
181. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
182. See supra Section II.D (discussing Doe v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia).
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be satisfied when (1) the foreign state intentionally committed the act,
(2) the act was expressly aimed at the United States, and (3) the foreign
state knew or should have known that the injury would be felt in the
United States. If this suggested interpretation is adopted, victims of
cyber torts will have an avenue through which.to pursue civil redress
against foreign states who perpetrate them. This result furthers
Congress's purpose in drafting exceptions to the FSIA yet is narrow
enough to protect the United States from significant reciprocity
concerns.
Samantha N. Sergent*
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A., 2013, Boston University.
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